THE PARADOX OF SOCRATIC WISDOM

Paradox, n. A seemingly contradictory statement that may nonetheless be true... - The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, 4th Edition.

Below is the relevant section from The Apology about the paradox of Socrates’ wisdom (pp. 5-6 in the text):

“Well, Chaerephon, as you know, was very impetuous in all his doings, and he went to Delphi and boldly asked the oracle to tell him whether - as I was saying, I must beg you not to interrupt - he asked the oracle to tell him whether there was anyone wiser than I was, and the Pythian prophetess answered that there was no man wiser.

Why do I mention this? Because I am going to explain to you why I have such an evil name. When I heard the answer, I said to myself, What can the god mean? and what is the interpretation of this riddle? for I know that I have no wisdom, small or great. What can he mean when he says that I am the wisest of men? And yet he is a god and cannot lie; that would be against his nature. After a long consideration, I at last thought of a method of trying the question. I reflected that if I could only find a man wiser than myself, then I might go to the god with a refutation in my hand. I should say to him, "Here is a man who is wiser than I am; but you said that I was the wisest."

Accordingly I went to one who had the reputation of wisdom, and observed to him - his name I need not mention; he was a politician whom I selected for examination - and the result was as follows: When I began to talk with him, I could not help thinking that he was not really wise, although he was thought wise by many, and wiser still by himself; and I went and tried to explain to him that he thought himself wise, but was not really wise; and the consequence was that he hated me, and his enmity was shared by several who were present and heard me. So I left him, saying to myself, as I went away: Well, although I do not suppose that either of us knows anything really beautiful and good, I am better off than he is - for he knows nothing, and thinks that he knows. I neither know nor think that I know. In this latter particular, then, I seem to have slightly the advantage of him. Then I went to another, who had still higher philosophical pretensions, and my conclusion was exactly the same. I made another enemy of him, and of many others besides him.

After this I went to one man after another, being not unconscious of the enmity which I provoked, and I lamented and feared this: but necessity was laid upon me - the word of God, I thought, ought to be considered first. And I said to myself, Go I must to all who appear to know, and find out the meaning of the oracle. And I swear to you, Athenians, by the dog I swear! - for I must tell you the truth - the result of my mission was just this: I found that the men most in repute were all but the most foolish; and that some inferior men were really wiser and better…therefore I asked myself on behalf of the oracle, whether I would like to be as I was, neither having their knowledge nor their ignorance, or like them in both; and I made answer to myself and the oracle that I was better off as I was.

This investigation has led to my having many enemies of the worst and most dangerous kind, and has given occasion also to many calumnies, and I am called wise, for my hearers always imagine that I myself possess the wisdom which I find wanting in others: but the truth is, O men of Athens, that God only is wise; and in this oracle he means to say that the wisdom of men is little or nothing; he is not speaking of Socrates, he is only using my name as an illustration, as if he said, He, O men, is the wisest, who, like Socrates, knows that his wisdom is in truth worth nothing. And so I go my way, obedient to the god, and make inquisition into the wisdom of anyone, whether citizen or stranger, who appears to be wise; and if he is not wise, then in vindication of the oracle I show him that he is not wise; and this occupation quite absorbs me, and I have no time to give either to any public matter of interest or to any concern of my own, but I am in utter poverty by reason of my devotion to the god.”

Questions for Analysis

1. To what extent is Socrates’ claim to have no wisdom rhetorical?

2. If you take Socrates in a wooden literal sense, what do you make of his assumptions that the the god Apollo exists, that Apollo speaks through the Oracle and that the god cannot lie? If knowledge of any truth is unobtainable, what do you make of Socrates’ repeated references to the truth and numerous positive assertions and arguments in favor of those assertions?  If he really believed that no one knows anything, wouldn’t he just proclaim his ignorance and refuse to make any assertions whatsoever or avoid expressing any beliefs about anything? Doesn’t Socrates, on the contrary, speak forcefully, confidently and with conviction on many subjects in the course of his defense?

3. If Socrates believed knowledge was impossible, what do you make of the numerous dialogues of Plato, where Socrates draws all manner of conclusions about the nature of virtue, knowledge and reality?

4. To what extent might Socrates’ statement that “God only is wise; and in this oracle he means to say that the wisdom of men is little or nothing” a call to have high standards for what we claim to know? Might this be Socrates' way of saying that we should make sure we can justify our beliefs (and that they are logically consistent) before claiming to know that they are true?

5. How might Socrates’ behavior be a clue to how to interpret his statements? Why does he devote himself to showing people they are ignorant? Just because God told him to? For sport? Just to be mean?

Here is the passage where Socrates refers to himself as a “gadfly” (pp. 11-12):

Men of Athens, do not interrupt, but hear me; there was an agreement between us that you should hear me out. And I think that what I am going to say will do you good: for I have something more to say, at which you may be inclined to cry out; but I beg that you will not do this. I would have you know that, if you kill such a one as I am, you will injure yourselves more than you will injure me. Meletus and Anytus will not injure me: they cannot; for it is not in the nature of things that a bad man should injure a better than himself. I do not deny that he may, perhaps, kill him, or drive him into exile, or deprive him of civil rights; and he may imagine, and others may imagine, that he is doing him a great injury: but in that I do not agree with him; for the evil of doing as Anytus is doing - of unjustly taking away another man's life - is greater far. And now, Athenians, I am not going to argue for my own sake, as you may think, but for yours, that you may not sin against the God, or lightly reject his boon by condemning me.

For if you kill me you will not easily find another like me, who, if I may use such a ludicrous figure of speech, am a sort of gadfly, given to the state by the God; and the state is like a great and noble steed who is tardy in his motions owing to his very size, and requires to be stirred into life. I am that gadfly which God has given the state and all day long and in all places am always fastening upon you, arousing and persuading and reproaching you. And as you will not easily find another like me, I would advise you to spare me. I dare say that you may feel irritated at being suddenly awakened when you are caught napping; and you may think that if you were to strike me dead, as Anytus advises, which you easily might, then you would sleep on for the remainder of your lives, unless God in his care of you gives you another gadfly.

And that I am given to you by God is proved by this: - that if I had been like other men, I should not have neglected all my own concerns, or patiently seen the neglect of them during all these years, and have been doing yours, coming to you individually, like a father or elder brother, exhorting you to regard virtue; this I say, would not be like human nature. And had I gained anything, or if my exhortations had been paid, there would have been some sense in that: but now, as you will perceive, not even the impudence of my accusers dares to say that I have ever exacted or sought pay of anyone; they have no witness of that. And I have a witness of the truth of what I say; my poverty is a sufficient witness.

Questions for Analysis

1. What does Socrates mean by comparing himself to a gadfly? In what way are Socrates’ “gadfly” activities “God’s gift” to the City of Athens? Though irritating and annoying, how do his activities benefit Athens?

2. What is the value of knowing that you know nothing? Could it lie in the fact that if you think you know everything already that you never examine your own beliefs to see whether or not they are true?

Here is the passage in which Socrates talks about “the unexamined life” (p. 15):

Someone will say: Yes, Socrates, but cannot you hold your tongue, and then you may go into a foreign city, and no one will interfere with you? Now I have great difficulty in making you understand my answer to this. For if I tell you that this would be a disobedience to a divine command, and therefore that I cannot hold my tongue, you will not believe that I am serious; and if I say again that the greatest good of man is daily to converse about virtue, and all that concerning which you hear me examining myself and others, and that the life which is unexamined is not worth living - that you are still less likely to believe. And yet what I say is true, although a thing of which it is hard for me to persuade you.

Questions for Analysis

1. If Socrates believed that knowledge is literally impossible, why is an unexamined life not worth living? Wouldn’t examining yourself and others be a complete waste of time, an exercise in futility?

2. If Socrates is a complete skeptic, why does he assert with confidence that the greatest good is to converse about virtue and other philosophical topics? Why does he live in poverty in order to spend all his time examining himself and others? Why has he devoted his entire life to philosophy? Why does he die for “the love of wisdom” if wisdom is unobtainable? Might not all these things suggest Socrates' claims to ignorance are hyperbole, exaggerated for rhetorical effect and to illustrate the importance of a skeptical approach or attitude toward any claim to knowledge? That is, isn't Socrates' claim that, in God's eyes, no one is wise paradoxically a call to think critically?