Locked INTO THE

ANTHROpOCENE? ExAMININg

THE ENVIRONMENTAl ETHICS

Of JOHN lOCkE ANd JEAN-

JACquES ROuSSEAu

ERIkA k. MASAkI

Many scientists argue that the world is becoming increasingly dominated by human activity, much to the detriment of the natural world. In what scholars have dubbed the Anthropocene, the current geological epoch during which time human activity has been the dominating force over climate and the environment, many questions of environmental ethics have arisen. Who does the earth belong to? What is the relationship between humans and the environment? What is the moral standing of non-human life? Locke and Rousseau provide varying answers to these questions, which are central to discussions of environmental ethics. In many ways, Locke and Rousseau’s answers are opposed to each other, suggesting a differing world view when it comes to environmental ethics. Locke’s understanding of environmental ethics seems to dominate, and perhaps even cause, the onset of the Anthropocene, but Rousseau’s response, and a potential turn toward his understanding of environmental ethics marks an ideological shift in the way that humans understand their relationship with the world around them. This paper argues that the writings of Locke and Rousseau correspond to different stages of the Anthropocene with significant effects on both environmental ethics and environmental governance and policy.

IntroductIon

One simply needs to turn on the news or visit social media to see evidence of the effect humans are having on the environment. From pictures of “trash islands” in oceans to turtles mistaking plastic bags for jel-lyfish, the pictures paint human activity in a heinous light. So influential is human activity on the environment that some scientists have given a name ETHICS & THE ENVIRONMENT 26, no. 1 (2021), 1–19

Copyright © The Trustees of Indiana University • doi: 10.2979/ethicsenviro.26.1.01

to this new epoch: the Anthropocene. The Anthropocene, “the current epoch in which humans and societies have become a global geophysical force” is argued to have begun circa 1800 with the onset of industrialization (Steffen et al. 2007, 614). Despite evidence that substantiates the effects humans have had on the environment, it is only relatively recently that people have started to advocate changes to human behavior to miti-gate the effects of human activity. Although there seems to be a new sense of urgency regarding environmental policies, many of these policies have failed to make meaningful progress toward solving key issues, perhaps because many policy makers overlook the fundamental questions of political theory and environmental ethics involved in creating policies geared toward solving environmental problems.

In many ways, a discussion of environmental ethics, which considers the relationship of humans to the environment, and the moral standing of non-human contents, such as plants, animals, and minerals (Brennan and Lo 2016), can rest upon the arguments of a few modern political the-orists. For example, John Locke argues that man’s labor gives nature its value, and suggests that nature is for man to exploit as long as he does not let items go to waste and leaves some for others. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, contrarily, argues for the natural fertility of the land, and sees nascent man as simply existing within the environment. This natural man stops only to eat and drink when he is hungry or thirsty and does not consume more than he needs. Most environmentalists would argue that the levels of con-sumption and degradation seen in the Anthropocene would suggest we are far from Rousseau’s natural man, so should Locke take the blame for the Anthropocene and all its connotations? How has the “winning” of Locke’s ideas over Rousseau’s brought humans to this critical point in global ecology? How have both Locke and Rousseau influenced global environmental ethics, and what type of environmental ethic currently serves as the foundation of global environmental governance? I argue that both Locke and Rousseau can be read from an environmental ethics perspective. The primary difference, however, between Locke and Rousseau is their view of human-centrality, or anthropocentrism, and the dominance of their ideas at different times of the Anthropocene. To demonstrate this, I will first discuss the onset of the Anthropocene, including historical, scientific, and political concerns. I then turn toward an examination of the environmental ethics of John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. I conclude with thoughts on the implications of both Locke and Rousseau’s environmental ethics.

the Anthropocene

The use of the term Anthropocene to describe the current geological epoch remains somewhat controversial as both natural and social scientists debate the use of the term and whether the Anthropocene 2

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is “real” in the scientific sense. In fact, much of the debate about the Anthropocene centers around the question of whether the Anthropocene is scientific or political “reality” (or both). Finney and Edwards (2016) argued that the International Commission on Stratigraphy (ICS), the largest constituent scientific body of the International Union of Geological Sciences (IUGS), should officially recognize the Anthropocene to encourage cross-disciplinary science and that not officially recognizing it could be construed as a political state-ment in itself, especially as many governmental and non-governmental bodies have begun to recognize the Anthropocene as scientific fact.

Within the community that believes in, and studies the Anthropocene, there is some disagreement about exactly when the Anthropocene began and about its different stages. A few assumptions, however, remain relatively consistent across the literature. There is general agreement regarding the definition of the Anthropocene, which focuses on the centrality of human activity on geology and ecology.1 Most scholars agree that the beginning of the Anthropocene coincides with the start of industrialization and the extensive use of fossil fuels, around the late 1700s to early 1800s.2 The invention and refinement of the steam engine in the 1770s and 1780s, argues Steffen et al. (2007) is what allowed for looser constraints on energy supplies, human population growth, and the global economy. While scientists debate the exact timing of the start of the Anthropocene, the circum-stances that led to the development of the Anthropocene (i.e. industrialization) are clearer.

The Anthropocene is generally divided into three stages: the Industrial Era (1800–1945), the Great Acceleration (1945–2015), and Planetary Stewardship (2015–present). The first era, the Holocene, is marked by the development of technologies using fossil fuels and denotes a time in which carbon emissions rose above the natural upper limit of the previous geological epoch (Steffen et al. 2007, 616).

The second stage, nicknamed the “Great Acceleration,” has received the most attention, particularly in the scientific research. According to scientists, the Great Acceleration started with the end of World War II in 1945 and runs through approximately 2015. During this time, in addition to rapid population growth, globalization, and petroleum use, “humans have changed the world’s ecosystems more rapidly and extensively than in any other comparable period in human history”

(Steffen et al. 2007, 617). Another characteristic of this time period is the global fallout from nuclear bomb tests, which have resulted in record high levels of radioactivity in ice cores, coral, and tree rings (Lewis and Maslin 2015, 176). The final stage of the Anthropocene is Planetary Stewardship, which was hypothesized to begin in 2015.3

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Steffen et al. (2007), when writing in 2007, estimated that by 2015, humankind would reach a sort of “tipping point,” at which time there would be recognition that “human activities are indeed affecting the structure and functioning of the Earth System as a whole,” which could lead to a failure of the business-as-usual approach and the “col-lapse of modern, globalized society under uncontrollable environmental change” (Steffen et al. 2007, 618; 619). In other words, without planetary stewardship, “carbon dioxide emissions . . . [are] expected to reach criticality, and the Earth System could pass through an irre-versible “tipping point” to a permanently warmer world” (Grainger 2017, 46). This tipping point, and the call to arms that it is intended to incite, conjures memories of the arguments made about peak oil, a theoretical point at which the global output of oil reaches its max-imum level and begins to decline. The problem with the peak oil theory is that despite calculations that peak oil would occur globally in 1995, it never happened, and some scholars argue this is no longer a key issue (Chapman 2014, Bardi 2019). Consequently, the question becomes, is the Anthropocene akin to Peak Oil Theory, or do humans need to take swift action to ensure that we do not reach the “Super-Warm” stage?

The onset of the Anthropocene is not only a scientific and political question, however. It is also a philosophical one. While much research has been done beyond the scope of this overview, it is primarily scientific (e.g. measuring the effects of human activity such as carbon emissions) and political (e.g. debating what policies to enact in the face of this increase of human activity) in nature. Some environmental ethics scholars and ecologists have addressed the moral value of non-human life, but few have attempted to reconcile the Anthropocene, environmental ethics, and modern political theory. Consequently, the paper turns toward a discussion of environmental ethics from the perspectives of John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

two VIews of enVIronmentAl ethIcs

Rousseau and Locke themselves may predate the Anthropocene, but their ideas give some insights into the events leading up to this era. Who does the earth belong to? What is the proper relationship between humans and the environment? What is the moral standing of non-human life?

Locke and Rousseau provide varying answers to these questions, which are central to discussions of environmental ethics. In many ways, Locke and Rousseau’s answers are opposed to each other, suggesting a differing world view when it comes to environmental ethics. Locke’s understanding of environmental ethics is generally seen to dominate, and perhaps even cause, the onset of the Anthropocene, but Rousseau’s response, and 4

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a potential turn toward his understanding of environmental ethics marks an ideological shift in the way that humans understand their relationship with the world around them.

who owns the eArth?

The question of who owns the earth is important to discussions of environmental ethics because the answer sets the foundation for who and what should be considered to have moral standing when considering environmental ethics and policies. Locke’s position is clear: humans are at the top of a hierarchy and thus have sole (as a species) ownership of the earth. He argues, “God, who hath given the world to men in common, hath also given them reason to make use of it to the best advantage of life, and convenience. The earth, and all that is therein, is given to men for the support and comfort of their being” (Locke [1689]

1982, 17–18). In particular, God “gave it to the use of the industrious and rational (and labour was to be his title to it)” (Locke [1689] 1982, 21). Although Locke is often invoked by those in support of strong property rights to the environment, one interpretation notes that God grants humans usufructuary rights to the earth, whereby humans have the “rights to use and enjoy God’s property for God’s purposes” (Tully 1980, 122). Trachtenberg (2014) argues that Locke makes this clear in the First Treatise when he states, “Men may be allowed to have property in their distinct Portions of the Creatures; yet in respect of God the Maker of Heaven and Earth, who is sole Lord and Proprietor of the whole World, Mans Propriety in the Creatures is nothing but that Liberty to use them, which God has permitted” (Locke [1689] 1988, 168). In other words, God is still the ultimate owner of the earth and all its contents, but humans have a distinct right to possess it, caveats to which will be discussed below.

Rousseau adopts a different approach to the possession of the earth.

In his discussion of the beginning of property, Rousseau bemoans its cre-ation and argues that much of human suffering may have been avoided if only someone reminded his fellow humans “You are lost if you for-get that the fruits are everyone’s and the earth is no one’s!” (Rousseau

[1754] 2012, 91). Furthermore, he thinks that the natural environment is something shared with animals. He notes, “While looking closely at fields, orchards, woods, and their numerous inhabitants, I have often thought that the vegetable realm was a storehouse of foods given to man and animals by nature” (Rousseau [1782] 1992, 94). This suggests that at least humans and animals are of similar, if not equal, moral standing. In other words, Rousseau suggests, contrary to Locke, that the earth was not given solely to humans to use for their convenience.

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nAture’s BeAuty And fertIlIty Another key concern in environmental ethics is the intrinsic value of the environment in and of itself. One’s understanding of the beauty and fertility of the natural world, therefore, can help to explain differing assumptions about the moral status of non-human life. Locke attributes most of the fertility of nature to human endeavor. Several times, he argues that human labor, applied to land, gives land its value. “He who appropriates land to himself by his labor does not less but increases the common stock of mankind. For the provisions serving to the support of human life produced by one acre of enclosed and cultivated land, are . . . ten times more, than those which are yielded by an acre of land of an equal richness, lying waste in common” (Locke [1689] 1982, 24). He goes as far as to say that ninety-nine percent of the value of land is attributed to human labor and the rest (i.e. one percent) is owed to nature. He argues,

“I think it will be a very modest computation to say, that of the products of the earth useful to the life of man, nine-tenths are the effects of labour”

(Locke [1689] 1982, 26), but he then goes on to argue that upon rightly estimating things, “what in them is purely owing to nature, and what to labour, we shall find that in most of them ninety-nine hundredths are wholly to be put on the account of labour ” (Locke [1689] 1982, 26).

Later, he further discounts the value of nature to one-one thousandth by pointing out that uncultivated lands in America are not worth a penny and reiterates that “‘Tis labour then which puts the greatest part of value upon land, without which would scarcely be worth anything” (Locke

[1689] 1982, 27).

Locke claims that all land has the same intrinsic value regardless of location, climate, and other considerations, as long as productivity of the land, given equal amounts of labor, remain constant. He states, “An acre of land that bears here twenty bushels of wheat, and another in America, which with the same husbandry, would do the like, are, without doubt, of the same natural, intrinsic value” (Locke [1689] 1982, 26). Again, for Locke, the value of the environment rests solely on how much of a given product similar plots of lands can produce. Consequently, he criticizes the Native Americans for not cultivating the land, calling uncultivated land a waste. He argues, “For the provisions serving to the support of human life produce by one acre of enclosed and cultivated land, are (to speak much within compass) ten times more, than those which are yielded by an acre of land of an equal richness, lying waste in common: (Locke [1689]

1982, 24). Locke continues this criticism by stating, “For I ask whether in the wild woods and uncultivated waste of America left to nature, without any improvement, tillage or husbandry, a thousand acres yield the needy and wretched inhabitants as many conveniences of life as ten acres 6

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of equally fertile land do in Devonshire where they are well cultivated?”

(Locke 1982, [1689] 24). Focused predominantly on the value of environmental output for humans, Locke does not mention anything of the intrinsic value of nature, save the meager one percent that nature can produce. He does not discuss the value of the environment’s beauty from a non-utilitarian viewpoint.

By contrast, Rousseau often celebrates the natural fertility and the inherent beauty of the earth. Rousseau laments the barren countryside.

He states, “Trees, shrubs, and plants are the attire and clothing of the earth. Nothing is so sad as the sight of a plain and bare countryside which displays only stones, clay, and sand to the eyes. But enlivened by nature and arrayed in its nuptial dress amidst brooks and the song of birds, the earth, in the harmony of the three realms, offers man a spectacle filled with life, interest, and charm–the only spectacle in the world of which his eyes and heart never weary” (Rousseau [1782] 1992, 92).

This suggests a natural bounty or fertility of the earth. More directly, he states, “The earth, left to its natural fertility and covered by immense forests which no axe has ever mutilated, at every step offers storehouses, and shelter to the animals of every species” (Rousseau [1754] 2012, 66).

Rousseau claims to have proved the natural fertility of the land by per-forming an experiment through which he compared the products of two equal plots of land, one covered with chestnut trees and one sown with wheat, and concluded that the fruits of trees can provide animals with more food than other sources of vegetation (Rousseau [1754] 2012, 123). Rousseau, therefore, believes in the natural fertility of the earth, in addition to its intrinsic value, a concept that appears completely foreign to Locke.

exploItAtIon

A final, and crucial consideration in environmental ethics is the accept-ability of the exploitation of the environment for human gain. Because Locke views the fertility of nature as a result of human enterprise, it should come as no surprise that Locke views the exploitation of the environment as a natural, and probably necessary, characteristic of humans.

Locke explains, “God gave the world to men in common; but since he gave it them for their benefit and the greatest conveniences of life they were capable to draw from it, it cannot be supposed he meant it should always remain common and uncultivated” (Locke [1689] 1982, 21). He further notes, “And hence subduing or cultivating the earth, and having dominion, we see are joined together . . . So that God, by commanding to subdue, gave authority so far to appropriate” (Locke [1689] 1982, 22).

Locke has no problem with connecting the labor of humans to their right to exploit the land and goes so far as to say that God commands it.

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Not only do Locke’s arguments suggest that the exploitation of the land is necessary at an individual level commanded by God, but he also makes an argument about the improvement to the community by the privatization of property. In fact, the privatization of land, particularly uncultivated, wasted land, is more productive, and thus more beneficial to one’s neighbors (Goldwin 2014, 491). Locke argues that in Spain, people are permitted to cultivate land without question and “the inhabitants think themselves beholden to him, who, by his industry on neglected, and consequently waste land, has increase the stock of corn, which they wanted” (Locke [1689] 1982, 23). Consequently, in some ways, Locke’s encouragement of human endeavor not only rests on an argument that it is a natural human tendency to exploit the earth, but he also appeals to a sense of community, and almost duty, to help others achieve the comforts of life.

On the other hand, Rousseau is disconcerted about the way that humans have come to understand nature only for its utility. Regarding plants, he observes, “Yet another thing contributes to turning refined people’s attention away from the vegetable realm: the habit of seeking only drugs and remedies in plants . . . We do not imagine that plant structure might merit any attention in itself” (Rousseau [1782] 1992, 92–93).

He later further laments this human practice by stating, “This turn of mind, which always brings everything back to our material interest, which causes us to seek profit or remedies everywhere, and which would cause us to regard all of nature with indifference if we were always well, has never been mine” (Rousseau [1782] 1992, 94). Rousseau suggests here that the inclination of humans to see the utility of nature, whether for medicinal or economic purposes, is not an intrinsic human characteristic.

Rather, it is something developed, probably with the development of society and modernization, a criticism that aligns with Rousseau’s critiques of the modern project in the Discourse on the Sciences and the Arts. In what comes across as an almost direct criticism of Locke’s view of labor and exploitation, Rousseau argues that this exploitation has made humans miserable, in addition to being unable to appreciate and enjoy nature’s beauty. He argues, “Thus he must call on industry, labor, and toil to relieve his misery. He digs in the bowels of the earth. He goes to its center, at the risk of his life and the expense of his health, to seek imaginary goods in place of the real goods if freely offered him when he knew how to enjoy them” (Rousseau [1782] 1992, 96).

By recognizing the problems associated with the exploitation of the environment, Rousseau foreshadowed many of the biggest concerns scientists and activists have about the Anthropocene and displayed an understanding of the potential ramifications of human development. He notes three potential consequences of civilization and growing populations, 8

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and it is his second note that could have served as a warning of the Anthropocene. He states, “The destruction of the soil, that is, the loss of the substance suited to vegetation, must accelerate in proportion as earth is more cultivated and its most industrious inhabitants consume its products of all kinds in greater abundance” (Rousseau [1754] 2012, 123).4 Rousseau’s observations and research even hint at common problems found throughout the Anthropocene, such as deforestation and desertification.5

Although Locke seems to encourage the exploitation of the earth and all it contains, he does provide two caveats that speak to a limit to that exploitation. Consequently, Rousseau is not alone in the warnings he provides about the exploitation of the environment. First, Locke argues that humans cannot appropriate for themselves more than they can consume.

He states, “As much as anyone can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils; so much he may by his labor fix a property in. Whatever is beyond this, is more than his share, and belongs to others” (Locke [1689]

1982, 20). He further argues, “But if they perished, in his possession without their due use; if the fruits rotted, or the venison putrefied, before he could spend it, he offended against the common law of nature, and was liable to be punished; he invaded his neighbor’s share, for he had no right, farther than his use called for any of them, and they might serve to afford him conveniences of life” (Locke [1689] 1982, 24–25). Consequently, one is not allowed to appropriate more than he or she can consume as this would be an irrational waste of effort.

Locke’s second caveat is that one must leave enough for others. He argues, “For this labour being the unquestionable property of the laborer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good left in common for others” (emphasis added) (Locke [1689] 1982, 18). Regarding the appropriation of land through labor, Locke argues, “Nor was this appropriation of any parcel of land, by improving it, any prejudice to any other man since there was still enough, and as good left; and more than the yet unprovided could use.

So in effect, there was never less left for others because of his enclosure for himself” (Locke [1689] 1982, 21). To support this claim, he offers the following example: “Nobody could think himself injured by the drinking of another man, though he took a good draught, who had a whole river of the same water left him to quench his thirst” (Locke [1689] 1982, 21).

This suggests that by leaving enough resources for others to consume, an individual does no harm to the community or to the collective ownership of the earth. At the same time, during Locke’s time, the type of wide-scale privatization of land that occurs today was not common, and thus, Locke may never have imagined that land could run out. Yet Locke does assert that a day laborer in England lives better than “a king of a large and Masaki Locked into the Anthropocene?

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fruitful territory [in America]” (Locke [1689] 1982, 27), suggesting that the effects of labor and privatization may not necessarily lead to resource scarcity. During this current era, however, resource scarcity is an imposing issue as people and governments scramble to find solutions to problems like water and food scarcity.

Even considering the caveats imposed by Locke’s use of nature, humans’ current exploitation of the environment follows directly from this line of thinking, and often, it appears that humans have forgotten these caveats imposed by Locke. In some ways, Locke’s caveats could be understood as striking environmentalist undertones, as these restrictions certainly point toward a general understanding of what is now called sustainability. Trachtenberg (2014) suggests that the inherently anthropocentric nature of Locke’s ideas almost demands a kind of sustainability. He argues, “In the Lockean spirit, that is, sustainability takes as its fundamental goal the survival of human beings, and conceives of the natural world as a means for attaining that goal” (Trachtenberg 2014, 106). In other words, because the environment is intended to help sustain human survival, Locke’s caveats are necessary for ensuring the continuation of the species. Perhaps, then, Locke is not as anti-environment as many activists would like to suggest. At the same time, however, people have forgotten these rules that Locke imposed, as humans continue to cause mass extinc-tions and environmental degradation.

Locked In

Examining the apparent differences between Locke and Rousseau regarding their ideas about ownership of the earth, their views on the beauty and fertility of nature and their stances on the exploitation of the environment, it may seem obvious that Rousseau’s views align more with what people currently consider environmentalism, or environmental activism. Many invoke Locke to justify the private appropriation of natural resources and oppose environmental regulation (Trachtenberg 2014, 99). Yet as previously discussed, Locke’s caveats do suggest at least some concern for the sustainability of the environment. If Locke’s arguments are not incompatible with environmental protection, why have so many critics cited Locke as a source of environmental degradation?

The primary difference between Locke’s caveats and Rousseau’s lamentations for the loss of the natural environment, is the intrinsic value placed on the environment itself. Locke states throughout his discussion of property that the earth is given to man, particularly to the industrious, and that all the provisions of earth are solely for the sake of supporting human life. Rousseau, on the other hand, saw human life as degenerating from a time when humans coexisted with the natural environment. Unlike Locke, Rousseau did not view humans as 10

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necessarily superior to other species, although he did see savage man as the best, and did not believe that the earth was solely for the purpose of maximizing human life. In fact, Rousseau saw the value of the environment in and of itself, as he made clear in The Reveries of the Solitary Walker. In other words, despite Locke’s caveats, his arguments cannot be read as advocating for the moral status of the environment, whereas Rousseau points to a higher moral value of non-human life.

With this delineation in mind, Locke’s view on the relationship between humans and the environment can be classified as anthropocentric environmental ethics. That is, a human- centered environmental ethic “that our attitudes to nature or to the various kinds of environmental policies adopted should ultimately be judged on the basis of how they affect human beings. Consequently, we do not have to take into consideration the well-being of other living creatures”

(Stenmark 2016, 3). Perhaps even more condemning of human behavior is that anthropocentrism assumes that “humans are the only beings with ultimate value. All else, it is assumed, has value only in its usefulness to humans” (McLaughlin 2003, 117). The dominance of Locke’s political teachings, then, is not necessarily the result of the right of property ownership of the environment, but rather a preeminence of an environmental ethic that puts humans and their needs at the center of all environmental considerations. In fact, it is precisely this anthropocentric view of humankind’s relationship with the environment that

“legitimates industrialism” (McLaughlin 2003, 117). Further under-scoring this view is the argument that this particular environmental ethic is the dominant social paradigm, the social reality that guides expectations within society (Devall 1980, 300). Devall (1980) argues that particularly in North America, economic growth is one of the most important measures of progress and that products of the environment are only a storehouse of resources that should be developed to satisfy growing populations and human demands (Devall 1980, 300). One might argue that this is indeed a legacy of Locke.

Rousseau, on the other hand, holds a more non-anthropocentric environmental ethic. Proponents of non-anthropocentric environmental ethics are critical of the way “natural products are treated merely as a resource for satisfying human needs and desires” (Stenmark 2016, 4). Additionally, non-anthropocentric environmental ethics see the intrinsic value of nature.

Proponents of this belief “think that in reality it is the exclusively human way of viewing nature that is ultimately responsible for our environmental problems” (Stenmark 2016, 4). Furthermore, some environmentalists argue that once people begin to view environmental ethics from a non-anthropocentric perspective, the destruction of the environment “obviously is a horrendous crime against the rest of nature (McLaughlin 2003, 117).

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The non-anthropocentric view also encompasses deep ecology, an area of ecology that takes a distinctly non-anthropocentric approach to the environment, providing an egalitarian view of humans and non-human inhabitants of the earth. From the view of deep ecology, the individual (human) is not outside of or above nature (Devall 1980, 303).6 Deep ecology is seen as a criticism of the dominant social paradigm, and consequently, Rousseau’s ideas naturally fit into the idea of deep ecology. Even in modern terms, Rousseau can be considered an environmental radical,

“an environmentalist demanding not simple reform, but the virtual recon-struction of society and of the economic, political, and ethical attitudes and institutions which bear upon or relationship to the natural world”

(LaFreniere 1990, 42).

Locke and Rousseau’s apparent differences suggest not that one is an

“environmentalist” and the other is not. Rather, Locke and Rousseau can be argued to both hold environmental ethics, but just of differing kinds.

Despite Rousseau’s critiques of modernity, the dominance of Locke’s anthropocentric environmental ethic, particularly in the West, has opened the doors for the development of the Anthropocene, particularly Stage 2

(the Great Acceleration). Locke’s Second Treatise is often cited as a foundation for American political life, but perhaps even more broadly, the anthropocentric nature of Locke’s arguments is a foundation for global environmental politics. Stenmark (2016) suggests that many of the global environmental policies in force now follow an anthropocentric environmental ethic, but ethics are rarely, if at all, discussed in the formulation of such policies. An anthropocentric or non-anthropocentric approach to policymaking, however, he argues, certainly does have implications for what policies develop and how and why they are implemented (Stenmark 2016).

Locked out

Despite the anthropocentric nature of current environmental ethics and policy, one may argue that there is a potential turn toward a more Rousseauian (i.e. a non-anthropocentric) approach to environmental ethics. Ironically, Rousseau assumed that his positions would never win public favor. He states, “Very few days pass without new reflections confirming how greatly mistaken I was to count on winning back the public even in another age, since with respect to me it is led by guides who are continually renewed in the groups that have taken a disliking to me. Individuals die, but not collective groups” (Rousseau 1992, 5).

This type of inertia may be seen in Stages 1 and 2 of the Anthropocene where the continued dominance of anthropocentric environmental ethics drove scientific and technological advancement. Stage 3 of the Anthropocene, however, the era of planetary stewardship, may mark 12

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a change in human thought, delineating a kind of Rousseauian turn.

Perhaps humankind has reached a time where changes in leadership and ideology have allowed Rousseau to win back the public in another age. Indeed, Lane (2014) argues that most environmentalists get many of their ideas from these elements of Rousseau’s theories, without acknowledging it, or many times, without even knowing it. Further supporting the claim that Rousseau unknowingly influenced the environmentalism movement of today is the argument that Rousseau is a prime example of a “pre-environmentalist” who is, and should be, “recognized as an important defender of nature for its value to humanity”

(LaFreniere 1990, 42). LaFreniere further argues that Rousseau set the foundation for the modern environmental movement, particularly in Europe, but also in America through his influence of writers like Goethe, William Wordsworth, and Ralph Waldo Emerson (1990).

Further suggesting a Rousseauian turn is public opinion supporting the non-anthropocentric view of environmental ethics. Stenmark (2016) notes that over time, the percentage of people who believe that humans and animals have the same value has increased. It is important to note, however, that believing humans and animals have the same value does not necessarily indicate a willingness to adopt non-anthropocentric policies, particularly when economic considerations are weighed against environmental ones. The most recent results of the World Values Survey (WVS) for example, suggests that worldwide, 47.1 percent of people believe that “Protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs,” while 43.6 percent of those surveyed worldwide feel that

“Economic growth and creating jobs should be the top priority, even if the environment suffers to some extent” (World Values Survey 2014).

This aggregate measure, however, is somewhat misleading as answers vary greatly between respondents of different countries. For example, the country with the highest percentage of support for environmental protection over economic growth was Malaysia at 73.6 percent, while the country that most supported economic growth over environmental protection was Haiti with 93 percent of respondents stating that economic growth was the top priority. This question has been asked since the 1995–1998 wave of the World Values Survey and worldwide response trends remained relatively consistent over time. This suggests that although there are many factors that affect people’s feelings toward the environment, environmental protection, and indeed, environmental ethics, a more non-anthropocentric view of environmental ethics has been accepted for quite some time now.

Another piece of evidence suggesting a Rousseauian turn in environmental ethics is an increase in the number of environmental agreements Masaki Locked into the Anthropocene?

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over time. A simple count from the International Environmental Agreements (IEA) Database7 reveals that the number of multilateral environmental agreements has increased substantially over the past three decades, aligning with Grainger’s (2017) assertion that planetary stewardship began in 1992 with the signing of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development. Although this is not a perfect measure, the increase in the number of environmental treaties suggests that many governments have recognized the need for collective action in solving regional and global environmental issues, many of which are a result of the developments of the Anthropocene. One problem with this measure, however, is it does not take into account the ethical impetus for such agreements—that is, are the agreements more anthropocentric or non-anthropocentric in nature? As Stenmark (2016) noted, most lan-guage used in environmental agreements is primarily anthropocentric, but a more in-depth examination of environmental agreements is needed to understand further the influence of anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric policies.

Table 1: Number of Multilateral Environmental Agreements Time Period

Number of MEAs

1900–1910

7

1911–1920

6

1921–1930

9

1931–1940

15

1941–1950

23

1951–1960

73

1961–1970

110

1971–1980

145

1981–1990

189

1991–2000

348

2001–2010

256

2010–2018

284

At the same time, and less profoundly Rousseauian, however, people are finally starting to realize the limitations of the global commons and the problems of scarcity. One of the limitations of Locke’s arguments is that he saw the goods of the earth as abundant, almost to the point of being unlimited. Ophuls and Boyan (1992) note that “Thanks to the Great Frontier, Locke and Smith found that there was so much abundance in the 14

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state of nature that a Hobbesian war of all against all was unlikely; every person could take away some kind of prize” (Ophuls and Boyan 1992, 204). Returning to the example provided of Locke’s caveats, Locke suggests that no one would be upset by someone drinking out of the river if he or she had the same river from which to quench his or her own thirst.

Consequently, one of the flaws of Locke’s assumption is that the river could always provide enough water for every person to quench their thirst.

It is worth asking whether society is turning toward a more Rousseauian, non-anthropocentric view of environmental ethics or whether the environmentalist movement is simply a panicked reaction in the face of scarcity. In other words, those who study environmental ethics must stop to consider whether this is a genuine turn, a shift in the dominant paradigm, and a movement toward a non-anthropocentric environmental ethic or a knee-jerk, anthropocentric reaction that continues to put the survival of humankind at the forefront.

conclusIon

Those who lament the state of the global environment may find comfort in Locke’s caveats and the anthropocentric rationale for protecting the environment. Those who prefer Rousseau’s non-anthropocentric interpretation of environmental ethics may be encouraged by the apparent turning of public opinion toward a more Rousseauian view of the relationship between humans and the environment. Revisiting the question of environmental ethics, specifically which environmental ethic, is key for moving forward with effective policies surrounding environmental issues. As Stenmark (2016) suggests, the prevailing environmental ethic (anthropocentric or non-anthropocentric) affects the way that domestic and international policies are implemented. Perhaps of greater concern, at least to those advocating for a move toward non-anthropocentric environmental ethics, is that the question of intent remains. In other words, why we advocate for environmental protections may be as important as the fact that we do advocate for them. Do people want to protect the environment because we think it will eventually fail us or because there is something inherently good in it? Even if the outcome of environmental policies remains similar despite these two views, certainly the ethics behind them still matter, as they should.

Although Locke’s writings have arguably shaped Western environmental ethics, and consequently, Western-driven environmental politics, those who would support Rousseauian critiques of the modern project as they apply to current environmental politics should find hope in Stage 3

of the Anthropocene, planetary stewardship. Certainly, a type of policy inertia favors the status quo, but there is some evidence that people are starting to see the world through a more non-anthropocentric lens. As Masaki Locked into the Anthropocene?

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the polls cited above show, public opinion may be turning toward an idea of the moral value of non-human life. In addition to the increase in the number of multilateral environmental agreements, the number of environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs) has also increased over time. Environmental activism is also at an all-time high.

Scholarship regarding environmental ethics and responsibilities has also become more developed, although still under-theorized. Eco-tourism is a booming industry. These changes over past few decades suggest a shift away from the Lockean ideology of exploiting the environment for the sole benefit of human life and may point toward the return of Rousseau.

Despite this, in some ways, the environment remains intrinsically anthropocentric, as even the use of the term “environment” suggests something that surrounds humans.

Humans may never be able to return to the state of nature, and the simple and pure life envisioned by Rousseau (indeed, even Rousseau himself knew mankind could not and should not go back), but the rise of the Anthropocene and the development of planetary stewardship suggest several things. First, it suggests that humans can, much to Rousseau’s surprise, overturn the apparent inertia of the dominant political and economic philosophies of the time. Second, it also suggests, on a less positive note, that humans may have reached a point where we had no choice but to begin to reject the Lockean principles lest we funnel ourselves into extinction as well. Third, even with the apparent turn toward planetary stewardship and increasing environmental awareness, environmental ethics is a necessary area of study to understand what is driving the rheto-ric behind these movements. That is, how does the anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric approach to environmental ethics affect practical environmental policies? This is particularly important as policy problems, particularly policy failures, raise fundamental political theory questions.

Perhaps humans have failed to solve some of the most pressing environmental issues because of the lack of political theory and environmental ethics as a foundation for environmental policy. Finally, a critical question remains in regard to the ultimate question of nature: is human activity part of nature, or somehow “above” it? In other words, is our current state, the Anthropocene, a natural condition of earth? Arendt (1963) remarks, about the proliferation of technology, that “All of this makes it more unlikely every day that man will encounter anything in the world around him that is not man-made and hence is not, in the last analysis, he himself in a different disguise” (Arendt 1963, 537). In either case, environmental ethics can help us to answer these questions in face of our own possible extinction.

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notes

1 The first use of the word “Anthropocene” dates back to 2000, when Crutzen and Stoermer (2000) first suggested that because of the “growing impacts of human activities on earth and atmosphere, and at all, including global, scales, it seems to us more than appropriate to emphasize the central role of mankind in geology and ecology by proposing to use the term “anthropocene” for the current geological epoch” (Crutzen and Stoermer 2000, 17).

2 Crutzen and Stoermer (2000) suggest the latter part of the 18th century as they argue this is when the effects of human activity became noticeable at a global level.

3 Grainger (2017) argues that Planetary Stewardship began in 1992 (with the inception of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development) and continues to this day and that another stage, “Super-Warm” will begin around 2100, during which time the planet will hit the

“real” tipping point that will occur if Planetary Stewardship fails.

4 Rousseau’s other two observations are that 1) woods would be the type of vegetation most conducive to replenishing the loss of vegetable matter due to animals, and 2) fruit trees provide animals with more food than other forms of vegetation (Rousseau 2012, 123). Rousseau claims to have made the latter observation after doing his own experiment by comparing two equal plots of land, one with chestnut trees and one with wheat.

5 He cites Buffon, who wrote, “But since animals give less to the earth than they take from it and since men consume enormous quantities of wood and plants for fire and other uses, it follows that the layer of topsoil in an inhabited country should always diminish and eventually become like the terrain of Arabia Petraea and like that of so many other countries in the Orient–which, in fact, is the most anciently inhabited region–where only salt and saw are now found” (Rousseau 2012, 122).

6 Deep ecology is not a singular approach or view. Deep ecology, however, rests on “Eight Points of Deep Ecology,” which were outlined by Arne Naess, who coined the term. According to Baard (2015), the eight points are as follows: 1. The wellbeing and flourishing of human and non-human life on Earth have value in themselves. These values are independent of the usefulness of the non-human world for human purposes. 2. Richness and diversity of life forms contribute to the realization of these values and are also values in themselves.

3. Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital needs. 4. The flourishing of human life and culture is compatible with a substantial decrease of the human population. The flourishing of non-human life requires such a decrease. 5. Present human interference with the non-human world is excessive, and the situation is rapidly worsening. 6. Policies must therefore be changed. These policies affect basic economic, technological and ideological structures. The resulting state of affairs will be deeply different from the present. 7. The ideological change will be mainly that of appreciating life quality (dwelling in situations of inherent value) rather than adhering to an increasing standard of living. There will be a profound awareness of the difference between bigness and greatness. 8. Those who subscribe Masaki Locked into the Anthropocene?

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to the foregoing points have an obligation directly or indirectly to try to implement the necessary changes.

7 Data taken from the International Environmental Agreements Database (Mitchell 2018). Table 1 shows the number of multilateral environmental agreements signed during each decade since 1900.

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ErikA k. MAsAki earned her Ph.D. in political science at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. She is currently a faculty member at Lane Community College. Her research interests include environmental ethics, global and regional environmental governance, and the effectiveness of environmental agreements with a specific focus on the Convention on International Trade of Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). E-mail: masakie@lanecc.edu

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